The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Conflicting Duties Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act by Miller, Elise
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 31 | Number 4 Article 4
1-1-1991
The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Conflicting
Duties Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act
Elise Miller
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Elise Miller, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Conflicting Duties Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 31 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 1063 (1991).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/4
THE FOX GUARDING THE HENHOUSE:
CONFLICTING DUTIES UNDER THE MARINE
MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, thousands of dolphin, or porpoises,' are indis-
criminately slaughtered in tuna nets. As well as being graceful
and beautiful, these mammals are highly gregarious.' Evidence
also suggests that man and Cetaceans have evolved in a similar
manner.' In comparing their intelligence to that of humans,
remarkable similarities have been found between the cerebral
cortex of man and of these mammals.4 Additionally, these
mammals are capable of complex intra- and inter-species com-
munication,5 and recent studies indicate that these creatures
have "[s]elf-consciousness and the ability to reason and to ex-
press creative thoughts."6 It is therefore not difficult to see
why a large number of people have come to view this senseless
killing as a great loss.
The mechanics of the food chain necessitate the killing of
one species by a dominant species. Humans, as the most dom-
inant species, are able to kill any other animal in their search
for food. The question is, do they have the right? Thousands
1. Cetacea are marine mammals which include whales as well as dolphin and
porpoises. Although dolphin and porpoises both belong to the order of Cetacea,
they are not the same animal. Dolphin are of the family delphinidae, while porpois-
es are of the family phocoenidae. Although dolphin and porpoises belong to two
different species, they are so physiologically, behaviorally, and morphologically
similar that the names have come to be used interchangeably. Levin, Towards
Effective Cetacean Prtection, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW., 549, 555 (1979).
2. Id. at 556.
3. Id. at 552.
4. A high degree of cerebral cortex convolution indicates a high degree of
intelligence. "It is within the cerebral cortex that those functions of the brain
associated with so-called intelligence are controlled . . . . The cerebral cortex is
also most likely responsible for thinking, memory, and language." Id. at 557. The
human brain is the most highly convoluted of all land mammals, and yet the
Cetacean's brain is more convoluted than the human's. Id.
5. Id. at 558.
6. Levin, supra note 1, at 552 (citing Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4
ENVIT'L AFF. 205, 217 (1975)).
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of dolphin are killed each year in commercial fishing opera-
tions. Mounting concern for these sea creatures has resulted in
various attempts at protecting the animals and ensuring their
continued existence.
In response to the growing concerns expressed about the
incidental taking of porpoises by tuna fishermen and the effect
on the marine environment, Congress enacted the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).7 The MMPA was designed
to regulate the taking of marine mammals by imposing a mora-
torium on intentional takings. Congress placed the MMPA
under the direction of the Department of Commerce.8 Vari-
ous subcommittees were formed in order to assist the Secre-
tary of Commerce in establishing and implementing guidelines
and standards for the regulation of commercial fishing.9
Notwithstanding the positive implications of such a mea-
sure, a conflict has arisen. The Secretary of Commerce ° (Sec-
retary) heads the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA), the subcommittee responsible for administer-
ing the MMPA. The National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS)" shares authority with the NOAA12 and the Marine
Mammal Commission (MMC),'3 a so-called "check" on the
MMPA. Thus, the Secretary is responsible for carrying out the
policies of the MMPA and protecting the marine mammals.
The Secretary is likewise responsible for promoting and pro-
tecting the interests of the commercial fishing industry, an
industry with a significant impact on this nation's economy. It
is highly unlikely that Congress intended to require the Secre-
tary to balance these competing interests. The question is
raised as to which interests prevail. According to the MMPA,
protection of marine mammals is the primary consideration. 4
7. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
8. Id. § 1362.
9. See Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795,
804 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
11. Id. §§ 1373-1374. The NMFS is the delegate of the Secretary with authori-
ty to grant permits under the MMPA. See Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries v.
Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37 (D.D.C. 1987).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1374 (1988). The NOAA is governed by the Secretary of
Commerce pursuant to § 1374 of the MMPA under the Reorganization Plan No.
4 of 1970, 5 U.S.C. § 903 (1970) (amended 1976).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988).
14. "The court found that the overriding purpose of the Marine Mammal
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Legislative history of the MMPA indicates a congressional in-
tent to subordinate the interests of the fishing industry to the
welfare of these sea creatures.15 As a further complication,
the Secretary is also one of the two officers jointly responsible
for determining which species will be included in the endan-
gered species list under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)."6
This comment sets forth the duties established under the
various organizations created to further the welfare of marine
mammals. Also presented is the conflict between the interests
of those involved in preserving and protecting these creatures
and the competing interests of fishermen, who depend on
these creatures yet indiscriminately slaughter thousands every
year in the course of fishing operations. Ultimately, this con-
flict of interest must be resolved. A profound sense of unfair-
ness results from a person acting in a dual capacity, like that of
the Secretary, representing both interests. The nature of this
conflict is such that no group will benefit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Commercial Fishing Operations
In the early 1960's, a new method of fishing for yellowfin
tuna was developed. It is highly efficient and economical and
replaces fishing for tuna with poles and live bait. -The new
method is known as "purse seine fishing." 7 It is based on the
observation that in the eastern tropical Pacific, one of the most
productive tuna fishing areas in the world, tuna habitually
associate with certain species of dolphin.18 Dolphin are larger
and more visible than tuna, are oxygen-breathing, and must
exist near the surface. Therefore, fishermen can locate the
accompanying tuna by searching for dolphin. When dolphin
are spotted, fishermen use speedboats to herd them into
mile-long nets. Both the dolphin and the tuna swimming be-
Protection Act was protection of the animals interests . . . ." Committee for
Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
15. "[A]nd the interests of the industry, important as they are, must be
served only after protection of the animals is assured." Japan Salmon Fisheries, 679
F. Supp. at 46 (quoting Committee of Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F.
Supp. 297, 309, aft'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
17. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. at 300.
18. Id.
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neath the dolphin are trapped when the net is closed or
"pursed" around them. Some of the dolphin escape by swim-
ming through an open hole at the top of the net, however,
many panic and dive to the bottom where their snouts get
caught in the net's webbing. Because the dolphin are unable to
get to the surface to breath, they drown. Dolphin are very
social and loyal, refusing to abandon fellow porpoises which
are entangled or injured. 9 This instinct results in further
deaths. Still others drown merely as a result of shock or other
physical injury.2
While the "purse seine" method is the most commonly
used method for catching tuna, there are three other proce-
dures to detect the presence of tuna schools.2' The first meth-
od detects schools by locating large areas of surface turbulence
which are generated by the feeding schools. Fishermen spot
these areas of the ocean that look like the water is boiling
(hence, the name "boiler" or "breezer") and set their nets on
the schools they have located.22 The other two methods are
based on the idea that tuna are known to congregate under
floating objects. The first of these two methods does not in-
volve dolphin, but instead uses tree trunks, branches or other
large floating objects (hence, the name "log sets").2" Finally,
the most common method is "dolphin sets," which involves
spotting a herd of dolphin believed to be associated with tuna.
It is this method with which we are most concerned.
Studies show that the catches resulting from the three
different modes of fishing are generally quite different in both
species composition and size of the fish caught. "Dolphin sets"
yield the largest tunas caught in purse seine fishing. They are
"mostly greater than 80-90 [centimeters], but frequently over
100-110 [centimeters], and almost all of them yellowfin."24
19. Levin, supra note 1, at 563-64.
20. Levin, supra note 1, at 564.
21. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Working Document 2,
Tuna-Dolphin Workshop, Incidental Mortality of Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Tuna Fishery, 1979-1988: A Decade of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission's Scientific Technician Program 2 (March 14-16, 1989) (available from
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Scripps Institution of Oceanography).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Incidental Mortality of Dol-
phins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Fishery, 1979-1988: A Decade of the
1066 [Vol. 31
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Canneries pay the most for large yellowfin because they pro-
duce greater yields with less labor. Although the average num-
ber of porpoises killed each time nets are "set" has de-
creased,15 the effectiveness of this method has led to striking
increases in its use, particularly by the U.S. tuna fishing fleet.
In fact, American tuna fishermen are responsible for "approxi-
mately 80 percent of the worldwide slaughter of dolphin and
porpoises."
26
In light of the indiscriminate slaughter of thousands of
dolphin, several methods have been developed to reduce mor-
tality. One of the two key developments is the "backdown ma-
neuver." In this procedure, the vessel is put in reverse after the
dolphin are encircled and most of the net has been retrieved.
This maneuver forms the net into a long channel, and the
corkline at the far end sinks, allowing the dolphin to escape.
The second key development is the "Medina Panel," which is
essentially a safety panel of very fine mesh along the outer
edge of the net. 27 These help prevent entanglement of the
porpoises in the larger mesh of the regular net. The Medina
Panel and other methods have considerably decreased the
mortality of dolphin. 28 Nonetheless, many dolphin are killed
"incidental" to tuna fishing.
29
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission's Scientific Technician Program (1989).
25. The average number of porpoises killed in each "set" in 1971 was seven-
ty, while in 1989 that number is reported to be approximately four. Office of
Resource Management, NMFS, Final Environmental Impact Statement on Promul-
gation of Rules and Proposed Issuance of Permits to Commercial Fishermen
Allowing the Taking of Marine Mammals in the Course of Normal Commercial
Fishing Operations (Nov. 18, 1975); telephone interview with Martin Hall
Balmaceda, Ph.D., Fisheries Biologist, Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Nov.
16, 1989).
26. Levin, supra note 1, at 551 (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Consemvation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Mel-hant
Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977)).
27. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(iv) (1975).
28. "It is estimated that 98% of the netted porpoise[s] are released, primarily
through the backdown procedure, and that 2% die." Committee For Humane
Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1144 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Prog-
ress of Research on Porpoise Mortality Incidental to Tuna Purse-Seine Fishing for
FY 1975, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Center 51 (Aug. 8,
1975)).
29. "Between 1959 and 1972, an estimated 5,746,000 dolphins were
killed . . . ." Levin, supra note 1, at 551.
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B. Historical Background
The problem is international, and the United States can-
not regulate the actions of other countries in waters outside of
its jurisdiction." However, because the United States is re-
sponsible for a large percentage of the incidental killing, Con-
gress felt that by regulating the American fleet, the United
States could ultimately impress upon other countries the ac-
tions and standards imposed upon the American fleet."
Thus, the MMPA was devised to protect species taken inciden-
tal to commercial fishing operations within U.S. jurisdiction,
without forcing American tuna fishermen to cease operations.
Congress saw two possible alternative approaches for pro-
tection when implementing the necessary regulations."2 The
first was a total prohibition against the taking or importation
of marine mammals."3 The second was a more flexible ap-
proach. Scientific management would be used to protect each
species in light of its individual environmental circumstances.
Congress elected to compromise in creating the MMPA. Thus,
the MMPA established a moratorium on the taking and impor-
tation of marine mammals which can be modified by regula-
30. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, May 9, 1952, United States-Canada-japan, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786
[hereinafter INPFC] was signed by Canada, Japan, and the United States in part
to minimize the interception of North American origin salmon by Japan in the
North Pacific and Bering Sea. In 1976, the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976), established a 20 0 -mile fishery conservation
zone surrounding the coast of the United States. Pursuant to this Act, no foreign
vessel may fish within this zone for fish stocks that are fully utilized by United
States fishermen. The Act called for some specific renegotiation of the INPFC,
which resulted in moving the abstention line. Furthermore, "section 1371 of the
MMPA imposes a moratorium on the 'take' of all marine mammals in water
subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S., including the Bering Sea and North Pacific
Ocean." Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37, 40
(D.D.C. 1987).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(c) (1988) is an enforcement provision of foreign imports
under the MMPA which provides for a ban on the importation of fish caught in
a manner which does not meet United States standards.
32. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 300, aff'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
33. "The Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial
fish or products from fish which have been caught with commercial fishing tech-
nology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean
mammals in excess of United States standards." 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
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tions and permits issued by the Secretary, consistent with the
goal of protecting marine mammals.3 4
Congressional research found that "certain species and
population stocks of marine mammals are, or may be, in dan-
ger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities...
[T]hey should not be permitted to diminish below their opti-
mum sustainable population.""5 The term "optimum sustain-
able population" is defined as "a population size which falls
within a range from the population level of a given species or
stock which is the largest supportable within the ecosystem to
the population level that results in maximum net productivi-
ty." 6 Mammals such as the dolphin have been described as
"[i]nterest bearing resources ... which are instrumental in
changing energy ... into energy available for consumption...
and which are such that their capacity to supply energy for
future consumption is not decreased by utilization of some of
the energy they supply."" Utilitarian theory forbids destruc-
tive utilization and mandates maximum sustainable yield."
Applying this to fish set for harvest, or in this case used to har-
vest other fish, the amount that we can harvest at a given pop-
ulation size without driving the population size down is deter-
mined by the rate at which the population can replace the har-
vested organisms, i.e., the growth rate.3 9 The two terms, "op-
timum sustainable population" and "maximum sustainable
yield" are based on a very similar idea. The expression "opti-
mum sustainable population" is used in the definition of "de-
pleted" as follows:
[A]ny case in which (A) the Secretary... determines that
a species or population stock is below its optimum sustain-
able population; (B) a State . . . determines that such spe-
cies or stock is below its optimum sustainable population;
or (C) a species or population stock is listed as an endan-
gered species or a threatened species under the Endan-
34. Id. § 1371.
35. Id. § 1361(1)-(2).
36. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1986). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (1988).
37. M.B. WILLIAMS, Discounting veaus Maximum Sustainable Yield in OBLIGA-
TIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 169, 170 (R. Sikora & B. Barry ed. 1978).
38. Id. at 169.
39. Id. at 178-80.
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gered Species Act of 1973.4o
The MMPA thereby established a moratorium on taking
and importing marine mammals and marine mammal prod-
ucts.4 However, exceptions remain available at the discretion
of the Secretary. The first exception involves the issuance of
permits. Congress realized that not all marine mammals are in
danger or depleted, and incidental takings might be allowed in
specific cases.4" However, the unnecessary killing warrants
regulation of some kind. Therefore, the Secretary was given
the authority to issue permits for the taking of porpoises, inci-
dental to commercial fishing, if the fishermen comply with
provisions of the MMPA.
The second exception is broader.4" Some incidental, but
not intentional, taking of marine mammals by commercial fish-
ermen is allowed under this exception, notwithstanding the
definitive goal of the MMPA to minimize or abolish the inci-
dental kill." Thus, under the first exception, permits can be
issued for intentional incidental takings of marine mammals
which are not endangered, and under the second exception,
certain unintentional incidental takings will be allowed.
C. Authority Under the MMPA
The MMPA is administered under the Department of
Commerce. Primary authority rests with the Secretary. The
Secretary is aided by the NOAA, the NMFS,45 and the
MMC.46 These organizations have been delegated significant
authority under the MMPA.47
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1) (1988).
41. Id. § 1371(a).
42. Id. § 1371(a)(1).
43. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
44. Id. § 1371.
45. The NMFS is the division of the NOAA responsible for carrying out the
functions prescribed by sections 1371 and 1373 of the MMPA. See infra text
accompanying notes 53-56.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988). The MMC is a separate advisory body whose
members are appointed by the President pursuant to section 1401 of the MMPA.
It is essentially a mechanism for gathering the information which the NMFS is
required to publish under section 1371 of the MMPA. See infra text accompanying
notes 56-60.
47. These agencies each have specific responsibilities, designated under the
MMPA in sections 1371, 1373, 1374, and 1401.
1070 [Vol. 31
MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
The NOAA is charged with administering the MMPA.4 s
This agency is responsible for fashioning "a workable permit
system on a species by species basis."49 The NOAA collects
data from various sources to make regulatory proposals from
which they promulgate regulations regarding the incidental
taking of porpoises by purse seine tuna fishermen under sec-
tion 1374 of the MMPA. The NOAA has responsibility for
overseeing the permit system. 50 Section 1371(a)(2) also makes
reference to two other sections of the MMPA. These sections,
1373 and 1374, also make reference to the NOAA's duty to
develop regulations and issue permits in accordance with stat-
utory guidelines.5 ' The overriding concern of the permits is-
sued by the NOAA is the marine mammals and that the tak-
ings "not be to the disadvantage of those species."5 2 After the
Secretary, the NOAA has the primary licensing responsibility
under the MMPA. However, this authority is shared with the
NMFS.SS
Like the NOAA, the NMFS is a delegate of the Secretary
with the authority to grant permits under the MMPA. 54 The
NMFS is a division of the NOAA, held to a statutory require-
ment to:
[P]ublish and make available to the public, prior to or
concurrent with publication of notice of its intent to pre-
scribe regulations under section 1373 of the MMPA, rea-
sonable estimates of (1) the existing population level of
each species of porpoise affected by the proposed regu-
lations, (2) the optimum sustainable population of each of
these species, and (3) the expected impact of those regula-
tions on the effort, mandated by the Act, to achieve an
optimum sustainable population level for each species."5
The NMFS, together with the NOAA, is charged with publish-
ing these findings as well as scheduling formal rulemaking
48. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 803
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 806.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
51. Kokechik, 839 F.2d at 804.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1373(f) (1988).
53. Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 299,
aft'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a), 1373 (1988); Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries
v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37, 41 (D.D.C. 1987).
55. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. at 312.
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hearings. Like the NOAA, the NMFS gets much of its informa-
tion and data from outside sources such as the MMC.56
The MMC is a separate advisory body, appointed by the
President to ensure that individuals will exercise their indepen-
dent judgment and give environmental concerns priority. 7 It
constitutes an independent commission of individuals knowl-
edgeable in the fields of marine ecology and resource manage-
ment and plays a significant advisory role under the MMPA.58
Its duties include studying and making recommendations to
federal agencies for the protection and conservation of marine
mammals.59 The MMC is responsible for reviewing the entire
MMPA program and suggesting areas of improvement.60
Since the MMPA was enacted in 1972, the Secretary, who is
responsible for the ultimate control of the MMPA, has been
faced with balancing the interests of the fishing industry
against those of the marine mammals which he is charged with
protecting.
D. The Endangered Species Act
The conflict over killing dolphin is further complicated by
the fact that the duties of the Secretary of Commerce in ad-
ministering the MMPA are also related to the Endangered
Species Act of 1972 (ESA).6 The policy of the ESA is for all
"[flederal departments and agencies [to] seek to conserve en-
dangered species and threatened species and ... utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. '6 2
Here, too, the Secretary of Commerce plays a major role in
the protection of marine mammals. Under this act, the Secre-
tary of Commerce is charged with the determination and pres-
ervation of endangered and threatened species, a responsibility
shared with the Secretary of the Interior.63
The Secretary of Commerce is vested with responsibility
for specific species, pursuant to the Reorganization Plan No. 4
of 197064 which established the NOAA. Under this plan, all
56. The MMC was created by 16 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988).
57. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 808
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
58. Id.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(4) (1988).
60. Id. §§ 1402(a)(1)-(4).
61. Id. §§ 1531-1543.
62. Id. § 1531(c)(1).
63. Id. § 1532.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 903 (1988).
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responsibility, authority and duties with respect to dolphin are
delegated to the Secretary of Commerce.' Determination of
endangered and threatened species is one of the duties that
falls under the ESA. The Secretary of the Interior is responsi-
ble for determining and listing endangered species, except for
"any species over which program responsibilities have been
vested in the Secretary of Commerce."66 If the Secretary feels
that any species for which he is primarily responsible should
be listed as endangered or threatened, or have its status
changed from threatened to endangered, he need only inform
the Secretary of the Interior, "who shall list such species in
accordance with the section."67 Furthermore, the Secretary of
the Interior "may not list or remove from any list any such
species, and may not change the status of any such species
which are listed without a prior favorable determination made
pursuant to this section by the Secretary of Commerce." 68
Thus, the Secretary also plays a substantial role in the protec-
tion of marine mammals as endangered species.
E. The Energy Reorganization Act: Another Model for Administra-
tive Control
At present, the Secretary is responsible for considering the
interests of both marine mammals and commercial fishermen.
There are, however, other methods of organizing administra-
tive control over areas of divergent interests. The Energy Reor-
ganization Act (ERA)69 provides an example of an alternative
system where separate agencies are charged with the responsi-
bility for opposing interests in order to alleviate the conflict of
interest which might otherwise exist.
The ERA was created out of Congress' concern that "the
AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] could not perform the
function of promoter of the nuclear industry and at the same
time protect public health and safety."7" The Atomic Energy
Act of 194671 was the first legislation to address nuclear activ-
ity. It established a design of federal control and created the
65. Id.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2) (1988).
67. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(A).
68. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(C).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891
(1982)).
70. Klausner, State Participation in the Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, 20
TULSA L.J. 31, 38 (1985).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1946).
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Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). About eight years later a
plan was devised to transform nuclear power into a source of
energy for the country, and consequently Congress passed the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).72 This Act was passed with
the intention of encouraging the use and development of
atomic energy.7" As the nuclear industry grew, Congress rec-
ognized the need for state participation in the development of
nuclear power and amended the AEA in 1959 to clarify the
respective state and federal roles in the field.74 One goal of
the amendments was to organize regulatory parameters while
concurrently recognizing state and federal interests. To accom-
plish this, "the AEC was given the power to promote the re-
search and development of nuclear energy and to consider
public health and safety in the exercise of its regulatory re-
sponsibility."75 Thus arose the conflict of interest which re-
sulted in the creation of the ERA.
The ERA, which recognized the dual nature of the AEC in
promoting the nuclear industry while protecting the public,
abolished the AEC, and divided its responsibilities between the
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ERDA was re-
sponsible for encouraging and conducting research and devel-
opment in the field of nuclear energy. The NRC was primarily
responsible for licensing and regulatory matters previously
performed by the AEC. Ultimately, the Department of Energy
Organization Act (DEOA)76 was adopted. This act abolished
the ERDA and gave all of its functions to the Department of
Energy (DOE), as well as all nuclear waste management.
Like the MMPA, the AEC was designed to carry out con-
flicting duties. However, the ERA was created with the recogni-
tion that the AEC could not effectively perform as both pro-
moter of and protector against nuclear energy. The current
system, which divides the conflicting responsibilities between
two administrative agencies, is a significant improvement over
the old AEC system.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1954).
73. Id.
74. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373 §§ 1, 73 Stat. 688 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988)).
75. Klausner, supra note 70, at 36.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (1988).
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F. Background of Case Law Regarding the MMPA
1. American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldridge
American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldridge77 set forth the pro-
mulgated regulations and the other factors upon which the
Secretary bases his decisions. In American Tunaboat, the Ameri-
can Tunaboat Association (ATA) had applied for a general
permit. A hearing was assigned to an administrative law judge
according to statutory requirements. At the hearing, the ATA
and NOAA differed vastly in their population estimates for the
dolphin under consideration. The administrative law judge
disagreed with the NOAA's method of collecting data. He
recommended a different method which would classify the
porpoise species under consideration not depleted. The NOAA
adopted the Administrative Law Judge's suggestion that the
dolphin was not depleted. However, the agency disagreed with
his recommendation concerning population collecting tech-
niques.
Ultimately, the NOAA disregarded valid information de-
signed to fairly assess the situation at hand. The discretion
given to the Secretary is thus extended to his delegates. This
case exemplifies one of the major concerns with the current
system. Where more than one agency is asked to bring its
knowledge to bear, the Secretary should not be allowed to
choose which information he will use. Instead, the Secretary
should be required to rely on all valid information without the
option of disregarding some of the information.
2. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n. v. Secretary of Commerce
Another case, Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n. v. Secretary of
Commerce,78 represents the theory that the Secretary, by bas-
ing his decisions on a lack of information, justifies issuing per-
mits to commercial fishermen. In Kokechik, the Federation of
Japan Salmon Fisheries Cooperative Association applied to the
NMFS for a permit for incidental takes.79 NMFS/NOAA, as
required by the MMPA, published a notice of the necessary
statutory information. Included were statements concerning
the status of each marine mammal stock affected and the ef-
77. 738 F.2d 1013 (1984).
78. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
79. Id. at 797.
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fects of any permitted taking on its optimum sustainable popu-
lation. The proposed regulation considered only the taking of
Dali's porpoise."0 Formal rulemaking hearings were held be-
fore a Department of Commerce administrative law judge, who
recommended issuing of a five-year permit allowing incidental
taking of a specified number of Dall's porpoise. The permit
included no other marine mammals, but it was foreseeable that
other marine mammals such as northern fur seals, northern
sea lions, harbor porpoises, Pacific white-sided dolphin and
killer whales would be taken. The permit application did not
request permission for those incidental takes because they
were prohibited by the MMPA. Thus, the legitimacy of the
permit in this case came under scrutiny.81 This case shows
that it is possible for the Secretary to manipulate the "lack of
information" in a permit application to shield himself from
responsibility for the incidental taking of otherwise prohibited
marine mammals, notwithstanding the foreseeability of those
takings.
3. Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson
Another highly controversial case demonstrates how the
Secretary can properly follow statutory procedure, yet circum-
vent the system devised under the MMPA by still issuing per-
mits. In Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson,"2 the
American Tuna Association (ATA), applied for permits for
purse-seine tuna fishing where there would be incidental takes
of various kinds of marine mammals, primarily two species of
porpoises. The Secretary, together with his delegate agencies,
issued a permit to the ATA in 1975 which allowed them to
take, subject to certain restrictions, an unlimited number of
marine mammals during the year. 3 As a result of informa-
tion obtained during public hearings on the matter, 4 certain
changes were made in the requirements of the tuna fishing
permits, but the incidental takings were still allowed.
When the ATA reapplied for a permit the following year,
the Secretary again allowed substantial takings in the course of
80. Id. at 798.
81. Id. at 800.
82. Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, aff'd,
540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 304.
84. Kenneth Norris, testifying on behalf of the MMC, stated: "[Elven the
most conservative estimate of porpoise mortality in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Tuna Fishery ... represents an unacceptably high level of mortality." Id.
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tuna fishing. 5 The MMC, in a letter to the NMFS, stated:
"[T]he Commission finds no basis for confidence that any
number above zero would provide the basis for 'assurance'
that the principal stocks of porpoise will increase in size."86
Nonetheless, the agency again announced that it would not
initially impose a quota for the year, but would do so if the
total number of porpoise deaths looked as if it would exceed a
certain percentage of the previous year's takings.8 7 Contrary to
the express purpose of the MMPA, the Secretary and his agen-
cies allowed intentional takings in an effort to avoid crippling
the commercial fishing industry.
III. ANALYSIS
The statistics relating to the slaughter of dolphin demon-
strate the need for regulating the incidental taking of marine
mammals by the tuna industry. The MMPA was created with
this in mind, and the protection of the marine mammals is its
primary purpose.88 The Secretary, as head of the MMPA, is
given both broad authority and relatively discretionary regula-
tory control. Although the Secretary is necessarily interested in
protecting the marine mammals, he is also responsible for pro-
moting an industry which indiscriminately slaughters many
thousands of these animals each year. The balancing act which
results was not intended by Congress when it created the
MMPA. This balancing act is not beneficial to either the en-
dangered marine mammals or the fishermen fearful of what a
suspension of the tuna fishing industry would create in terms
of economic losses.
The Secretary has faced this balancing of interests on
many occasions since Congress enacted the MMPA in 1972.
Commercial fishing does not permit discrimination between
which species of fish and mammals will be caught and which
will not. Thus, marine mammals protected by the MMPA are
unintentionally caught, a result "prohibited by the MMPA un-
less, pursuant to the requirements of the Act, the Secretary of
Commerce specifically grants permission for the taking of
85. Proposed regulations for the 1976 fishing season indicated a quota some-
where in the range of 50,000 to 110,000 animals. Id. at 305.
86. Id. (citing letter from Robert Eisenbud, General Counsel for the MMC, to
Robert Schoning, Director of the NMFS).
87. Id. at 304.
88. "The primary purpose of the MMPA is to protect marine mam-
mals . . . ." Id. at 306.
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marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing."89 This is
where the Secretary's duty becomes discretionary.
A permit might be granted if the Secretary and related
agencies feel that certain marine mammals are not in signifi-.
cant danger of depletion.9 ° Therefore, minor incidental tak-
ings do not disadvantage these species.
The MMPA has consistently rejected a "means oriented
approach."9 ' Accordingly, the MMPA:
[I]s not primarily a directive as to how marine mammals
may be taken; rather, it is result-oriented: it directs that an
estimated impact of any proposed taking be made and
provides that such taking may not be authorized if the
impact is to the disadvantage of the mammals involved.9'
The Secretary is therefore granted inordinate discretionary
power to decide whether a disadvantage to the animal is sub-
stantial enough to overcome competing interests. The duty of
determining which species of marine mammals are "disadvan-
taged" or "depleted" within the meaning of the MMPA is dele-
gated to the NOAA.9 3
"The basic approach of the statute and regulations has
been to impose yearly quotas on the taking of abundant por-
89. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 799
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371, 1373 (1988). In Committee for Humane Legislation v.
Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C.Cir. 1976), defendants argued that section 1373(a)
directs the Secretary to prescribe regulations under that section "on the basis of
the best scientific evidence available." It excused the failure to determine the
impact of a proposed taking on optimum sustainable population levels if he is
unable to obtain such information from the best evidence available. The court
rejected this argument, stating that the phrase means "that if the agency comes to
the conclusion that a proposed level of taking will not be to the disadvantage of
the marine mammals involved, then that conclusion must be based upon and
supported by the best scientific evidence available." Id. at 311 n.32.
[T]he Secretary has interpreted the MMPA so as to allow him
to issue a permit to the Federation to take one species of mammal,
DalI's porpoise, for which the required finding of no disadvan-
tage ... has been made, even though the Secretary knows other
species will also be taken and as to these other species no such find-
ing has been made.
Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D.D.C.
1987).
91. Committee of Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 308
(D.D.C. 1976), affd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
92. Id.
93. American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldridge, 738 F.2d 1013, 1014-15 (9th Cir.
1984).
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poise species by tuna fishermen, and to prohibit the taking of
any species deemed depleted."94 This ultimately allows the
NOAA to determine which species are to be regulated by the
Secretary under the MMPA. The basis upon which the Secre-
tary decides which takings will be granted permits is unclear.
When the Secretary determines than an animal is "not disad-
vantaged," part of his rationalization may stem from the fact
that he is charged with regulating the incidental slaughter of
these marine mammals, while at the same time, facing the
responsibility of looking out for the interests of the commer-
cial fishing industry.
The Secretary protects the interests of the fishermen, and
therefore has a strong incentive for allowing the incidental tak-
ing of marine mammals. "It is clear that Congress did not
intend that the Marine Mammals Protection Act would force
American tuna fishermen to cease operations; the Act does not
prohibit purse-seine fishing on porpoise."95 Congress was
aware that invalidating commercial fishing permits would be
disastrous to the commercial fishermen operating under those
permits. For this reason the Secretary is authorized to waive
the moratorium provided that several statutory criteria are
met.
Section 1373 of the MMPA determines the criteria which
the Secretary may consider when prescribing regulations under
the MMPA. The statute includes a wide range of factors such
as "the effect of limitations on present and future animal pop-
ulations, U.S. treaty requirements, ecological and environmen-
tal considerations, the conservation and development of fishery
resources and economic and technical feasibility."96 For exam-
ple, in the regulatory process, the Secretary must consider the
technical capability of fishermen to avoid injury to porpoises.
"It is not the intention of the Committee to shut down or sig-
nificantly to curtail the activities of the tuna fleet so long as the
Secretary is satisfied that the tuna fishermen are using eco-
nomically and technologically practicable measures to assure
minimal hazards to marine mammal populations."97 Inevita-
bly, the Secretary will also consider the interests of the com-
mercial fishing industry when promulgating regulations and
permitting incidental takings.
94. Id. at 1015.
95. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
96. Id. at 1148 (citing Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Senate Com-
merce Committee, S. Rep. No. 92-863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972)).
97. Id. at 1148.
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Regardless of the fact that strict statutory criteria must be
satisfied before the Secretary is allowed to waive the moratori-
um, the Secretary and his delegates may circumvent these re-
quirements in numerous ways. The statute requires the Secre-
tary to justify his decisions based on the welfare of the marine
mammals.98 Before permissible takings can occur under the
exception to the moratorium, two statutory requirements must
be met. The first is that the taking must be authorized by regu-
lations promulgated through formal rulemaking proceedings
and a permit issued by the Secretary.99 The second is that the
taking must meet the requirements of the MMPA and be con-
sistent with its primary goal.'00
The procedural requirements with which the Secretary
must comply in promulgating regulations are set forth in sec-
tion 1373(d) of the MMPA, which reads:
The Secretary shall publish and make available to the
public either before or concurrent with the publication of
notice in the Federal Register of his intention to prescribe
regulations under this section-
(1) a statement of the estimated existing levels of the spe-
cies... ;
(2) a statement of the expected impact of the proposed
regulations on the optimum sustainable population ... ;
(3) a statement describing the evidence before the Secre-
tary upon which he proposes to base such regulations; and
(4) any studies made by or for the Secretary or any recom-
mendations made.'
0
'
Clearly defined procedural requirements are prescribed for the
rulemaking process. However, these statutory requirements
leave several questions unanswered. The first question is: Upon
what information does the Secretary base his decisions? Ac-
cording to the statute, he must promulgate rules based on data
and recommendations provided by agencies such as the MMC
and the NOAA. However, it not necessary to comply with this
regulation. The question then becomes whether the Secretary
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1373 (1988).
99. Id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 216 (1990).
100. "[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether the Secretary's interpretation . ..
is reasonable and consistent with the statutory language, legislative history, and
purpose of the MMPA . . . ." Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries v. Baldridge,
679 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D.D.C. 1987).
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1373(d) (1988).
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may disregard information and recommendations given to him
by the appropriate agencies.
Section 1373(a) of the MMPA provides that "[t]he Secre-
tary, on the basis of the best scientific evidence available and
in consultation with the Marine Mammal Commission, shall
prescribe such regulations. "102 In American Tunaboat, the
NOAA's final decision rejected the recommendations of the
administrative law judge and approved the NOAA collection
techniques. The court held that "[i]n light of the comprehen-
sive and reliable nature of the data collected by the federal
observers, it was arbitrary for the agency to have simply disre-
garded it. Without offering any reason, the agency refused to
consider the post-1977 data."' 3 However, the discretion giv-
en to the Secretary and his delegate authorities is clear. Ulti-
mately, the agency may select the information it will utilize.
Likewise, the Secretary may use his own delegates and agencies
to provide that information, thus obtaining statistics and deriv-
ing the reasoning necessary to justify the particular situation at
hand in the light most favorable to his needs.
Similarly, by basing his decisions to issue permits on a lack
of information, the Secretary may justify his exceptions to the
moratorium. In several cases, the Secretary has issued permits
where estimates of existing population levels of the species
involved and other statutorily required information was un-
available. In Kokechik, the question was "whether the Secretary
of Commerce may legally issue a permit allowing incidental
taking of one protected marine mammal species knowing that
other protected marine mammal species will be taken as
well."' 4 Despite the Secretary's inability to determine to
what extent these other marine mammals would be disadvan-
taged, he issued a permit from the position that "as long as it
did not specifically authorize the taking of northern fur seals
[and other protected marine mammals] he had complied with
the MMPA. The result was, in effect, that the permit allowed
the Federation to take protected marine mammals for a
price-the civil penalties imposed for such takings."'0 5
In another case, 10 6 permits were issued and quotas estab-
102. Id. § 1373(a).
103. American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldridge, 738 F.2d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir.
1984).
104. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 800
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 801.
106. Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, af'd,
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lished on the basis that the allowable kills would enable the
particular stocks of animals to increase. However, in the very
same notices, the agency had given estimates for existing popu-
lation levels and stated that "[o]ptimum sustainable population
levels have not been determined; therefore, no statement can
be made as to the effect of the proposed action on optimum
sustainable populations."' 7 The permits were approved in
clear violation of the rules for their issuance under the MMPA,
which state that the Secretary must publish and make this in-
formation available. The notice then went on to state, "[a]t
these levels of incidental fishing mortality, the present popula-
tion stocks are either stable or increasing or decreasing slight-
ly." s08 Such a statement is both ambiguous and contrary to the
intention of the MMPA; by requiring the Secretary to issue
such notices, Congress was trying to avoid the arbitrary cre-
ation of rules or issuing of permits.
Even though Congress created an additional "check" in
the decisionmaking process of the NOAA's permit decisions
(by requiring the NOAA to consult with the MMC before pre-
scribing regulations governing takings) there are ways of cir-
cumventing these "checks." In Kokechik, as previously noted,
the NOAA consulted with the MMC and "accepted the MMC's
recommendation not to issue a permit for the taking of fur
seals over the contrary recommendation of the administrative
law judge.""0 9 The Secretary's decision considered the MMC's
recommendations as required, and followed the statutory rules
for promulgating regulations. Nonetheless, incidental takings,
necessary to the Federation's fishing operations and contrary
to the MMPA, were foreseeable. By not allowing the takings in
permit regulations, the Secretary was, in a sense, saying that he
did not condone the actions of the commercial fishermen,
while simultaneously taking no action to directly prevent them.
Essentially, the "check" provided by the MMC is controlled by
the Secretary, which completely undermines the significance of
this limitation.
Other evasions of the MMPA rules also occur. For exam-
ple, the Secretary acts in accordance with the MMPA by ac-
cepting recommendations and submitted information. Howev-
er, he can then disregard the information and issue a permit,
540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
107. Id. at 305 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 41536 (1975)).
108. Id.
109. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 808
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, j., dissenting).
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by using some other justification not based on a lack of infor-
mation. In Richardson, the agency justified its decision to allow
substantial takings for the second year in a row by saying that
it:
[R]epresents, at this time, the most reasonable way that it
can meet its responsibility to reduce porpoise mortality
incidental to yellowfin tuna fishing and its responsibility
not to shut down or significantly curtail the activities of
the tuna fleet as set forth in the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act and its legislative history."'
This returns us to the primary purpose of the MMPA.
Courts have repeatedly, held that the primary purpose for en-
acting the MMPA was "to provide marine mammals, especially
porpoise[s], with necessary and extensive protection against
man's activities."' There are several ways to analyze the
congressional intent in enacting the MMPA.
In Richardson, the defendants-the Secretary, the Adminis-
trator of the NOAA, and the Director of the NMFS-took the
position that the MMPA resulted from Congress' dual concern
"for the well being of the porpoise and of the tuna industry,
and that this dual concern was intended to 'be expressed in
action taken at the agency level.""' The plaintiffs in this case
asserted that the primary purpose of the MMPA was to protect
marine mammals, and that "other interests, such as those of
the tuna industry, should be served only if they are compatible
with this primary goal."" 3
The defendants, in their brief in support of their
cross-motion for summary judgment, contended: "The man-
date of Congress is that the [federal agency] should try to re-
duce porpoise mortality rates but in a way that will maintain a
healthy United States tuna industry."' 14 The defendants es-
sentially took the position that the MMPA mandates a "balanc-
ing act" between the interests of the mammals and those of
the tuna industry. However, the Court ruled that "the primary
purpose of the MMPA is to protect marine mammals; the Act
was not intended as a 'balancing act' between the interests of
the fishing industry and the animals." ' Furthermore, the
110. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. at 305 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 56899 (1975)).
111. Id. at 306.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 306 n.21 (citing brief for defendants-intervenors at 2).
115. Id. at 306.
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court stated that "[t]he interests of the marine mammals come
first under the statutory scheme, and the interests of the indus-
try, important as they are, must be served only after protection
of the animals is assured.""
16
Clearly, actions of the Secretary which balance the inter-
ests, or worse, disadvantage the protected marine mammals,
are contrary to the intention of the MMPA. "The statutory
duty of the Secretary is thus mandatory, not discre-
tionary."1 7 The purpose of the MMPA is "to restore, main-
tain, and protect the integrity of the marine mammal popula-
tions.... Competing interests are involved regarding the
Secretary's duty to consider the interests of the commercial
fishing industry as well as those of the marine mammals. For
these reasons, there must be an alternative system of regula-
tion under the MMPA.
Congress can resolve the problems created by the conflict-
ing interests by dividing the duties designated to the Secretary
under the MMPA. As an alternative to the present system of
regulation under the MMPA, Congress should adopt a plan
where the interests of the marine mammals and those of the
fishermen are promoted separately, under different authori-
ties. The ERA serves as a model for this concept and demon-
strates that such a system would be plausible. As the ERA dem-
onstrates, a need exists for separate agencies to perform very
different functions.
A conflict of interest arose under the AEC when the agen-
cy was charged with performing conflicting duties. The
dual-nature of the present system under which the Secretary,
who is charged with carrying out the intentions of the MMPA
as well as promoting and looking out for the interests of com-
mercial fishermen, is very similar. As with the AEC, a system
of centralized responsibility has a tendency to hamper the
concerns of both interests involved. Just as Congress promul-
gated the ERA to differentiate the conflicting interests in the
field of nuclear energy, separate bodies of regulation should
be established for the opposing interests of the MMPA and the
fishing industry.
116. Id. at 309.
117. Japan Salmon Fisheries v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37, 47 (D.D.C. 1987).
118. Id. at 49.
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IV. PROPOSAL
Under the present system, the Secretary regulates the
competing interests of prey and predator. This system must be
restructured to prevent any abuse of power on the part of an
individual or single agency. An alternative approach must be
offered. In order to demonstrate the feasibility of such a sys-
tem, the Energy Reorganization Act will be used as a model.
The opposing interests in this field should be separated, as
occurred with the ERA. One agency could be established to
promote and recognize the interests of the fishing industry,
while another agency could be created to regulate and identify
the concerns about the marine mammal populations. Presum-
ably, as the DEOA demonstrates, this agency could be expand-
ed to include the appointed data collection agencies, as well as
other animal protection agencies.
Undoubtedly, conflicts between the two interests would
arise and would ultimately have to be resolved. However, rath-
er than one administrative agency being pulled in two direc-
tions, each opposing side would be responsible for its own
interests. It is sufficiently clear that the tuna fleet would be
seriously harmed should the general permit for purse seine
fishing be withdrawn. However, the arguments "properly
should be addressed to Congress rather than to the courts.
Balancing of interests between the commercial fishing fleet
and the porpoise is entirely a legislative decision, dictated at
present by the terms of the Act."' 9
Under the proposed structure there would be no need to
change the regulations presently in effect under the MMPA.
The current regulatory system tends toward leniency and inac-
tion. By removing the Secretary's conflict as well as the dis-
cretionary power given to a single agency, there is less likeli-
hood of violations such as those which occurred in the past
when the Secretary was faced with two sides of a situation that
were diametrically opposed. By taking the decisionmaking
away from a single agency and placing it with an impartial
judge, much of the inherent unfairness which results from the
fox guarding the henhouse will be eliminated.
119. Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1151
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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V. CONCLUSION
By abolishing the dual nature of the Secretary's position,
the MMPA would be more efficiently administered, and there-
fore more likely to uphold the true intent of the Act. "[T]he
Act was to be administered for the benefit of the protected
species rather than for the benefit of commercial exploita-
tion."120 By providing separate agencies to promote the in-
terests of both sides and employing an impartial decision-
making body, any conflicts would be more equitably resolved.
This is particularly true insofar as the interests of the marine
mammals are concerned. Their interests should receive top
priority in an attempt to abolish the unnecessary slaughter that
results from commercial fishing methods. By implementing a
system which recognizes the conflict which arises when a single
officer or agency performs the function of both promoter and
protector of an interest, the Secretary would be relieved of the
burden placed on him by the dual nature of his position.
The shortcomings of the present approach are painfully
clear. It is up to Congress to alleviate the burden placed on
the Secretary by forcing him to regulate conflicting interests
under one Act. By providing representative agencies for both
interests, both will ultimately benefit. By delegating to one
agency the duty to collect data and make recommendations
when questions or problems arise, the decision-making body
will not be presented with information contrived by different
methods and divergent standards. By eliminating the conflict
of interest, Congress will ensure that both interests will be
properly served and conflicts between these interests will be
equitably resolved.
Elise Miller
120. Id. at 1148.
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